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STOPPING THE BABY-TRADE: AFFIRMING THE
VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE THROUGH THE
INVALIDATION OF SURROGACY CONTRACTS: A
BLUEPRINT FOR NEW MEXICO
JAY R. COMBS
I. INTRODUCTION
In reality, the origin of a human person is the result of an act of giving. The one
conceived must be the fruit of his parents' love. He cannot be desired or
conceived as the product of an intervention of medical or biological techniques;
that would be equivalent to reducing him to an object of scientific technology.
No one may subject the coming of a child into the world to conditions of
technical efficiency which are to be evaluated according to standards of control
and dominion.'
After much searching, the couple finally found an egg that contained the precise
genetic characteristics they were looking for. They paid their money to the clerk at
the register and took their egg in search of some sperm to fertilize it. No ordinary
sperm would do-this couple was willing to pay any price for the genetically prime
sperm to create their perfect child. After some searching, they found the sperm they
were looking for. The eager parents-to-be paid their money and took all of the
ingredients for their future "bundle of joy" to the lab for fertilization. After a little
mixing it was time to implant the newly fertilized egg into a specially chosen
gestator who would deliver the product in nine months. But nine months is an
awfully long time to wait for such a busy couple, so after six months it was time to
cancel delivery and just call the whole thing off.
Such a supermarket analysis of the conception and birth of a human being seems
appalling because it treats the creation of a human being with little more dignity
than the purchase of a piece of furniture, but in many states, sophisticated medical
technology and a lack of statutory guidance regarding surrogacy arrangements have
made just this sort of situation possible.2 This Comment analyzes the problems
created by the enforcement of surrogacy contracts and proposes legislation by
which New Mexico can proactively protect its children and parents from the social
and legal dangers of surrogacy contracts.
First, this Comment will explore three of the most compelling policy reasons for
voiding surrogacy contracts: (1) the societal consequences of allowing the
redistribution of procreation through contract; (2) "maternal" arguments3 for the
protection of the hired surrogate; and (3) current policies which are embedded in

1. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCrRINE OF THE FAInTH, PuB. NO. 156-3, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR
HUMAN LFE INTS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION 28 (1987).

2. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998). The Buzzanca situation, in which
"contractual parents" purchase both egg and sperm then have them implanted in a surrogate, represents the current

extreme in the practice of surrogate parentage because it presents a possibility of six different legal parents (the two
"contractual parents," the two biological parents, and the surrogate and her husband).
3. See Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A MaternalisticApproach to Surrogacy, 81 VA. L REV. 2377, 2387

n.2 (1995) (arguing that the feminist counterpart to a paternalistic decision-making process is "maternalism" and
that this viewpoint advocates for the best interests of the children and parents from the mother's perspective).
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New Mexico statutes. Second, this Comment will analyze other state statutes which
have made surrogacy contracts unenforceable. Finally, based on the analysis of
policy and state laws, this Comment proposes a statute that New Mexico should
adopt. The proposed statute will then be analyzed to see how it should be applied.
II.

POLICY REASONS FOR VOIDING SURROGACY CONTRACTS

A.

The Societal Consequences of Allowing the Redistribution of Procreation
Through Contract
Most issues in contract law hold great weight for individual litigants but little
lasting impact for society at large and even less impact upon future generations.
However, the use of contract law as a vehicle for reordering or redistributing
procreative resources creates an interplay between the commercial realm and the
fundamental facets of what we are as individuals and a society.4 Because this issue
touches on the almost unimaginable breadth of what it is to be a human being, it is
difficult to concisely address. However, this Comment will examine two
fundamental concerns which the enforcement of surrogacy contracts raises in New
Mexico. The first is the concern over how society must meet its duty to protect
human dignity and equality by forbidding the commodification of human beings;
the second is the related concern that surrogacy contracts are illegal because they
violate the Thirteenth Amendment5 since they market in human beings.
From the founding days of our nation we have recognized a duty to protect the
dignity and equality of human life.6 Over time we have expanded these protections
when we have recognized that current protections were lacking." Included within
the state protection of the dignity of human life are prohibitions that proscribe
contractual alienation of goods and services which offend the basic dignities our
society embraces. For example, prohibitions on the alienation of human flesh for
consumption, human organs for profit, and the commercial alienation of sex are
widely accepted as necessary for the protection of human dignity.'
1. The Commodification of Children as an Offense to Human Dignity
Allowing resources to be exchanged through contract requires that they be
commodified. ° The contractual reallocation of procreation through surrogacy results
in the commodification of both children and women. Treating women and children

4. See William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental
Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L REV. 1, 7 (1990).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XII, § 1. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the
United States."
6. See THE DECAION OF INDEPENDENCE para I (U.S. 1776). "We hold these truths to be self-evident,

that all men are created equal, that they am endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness ......
7. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (extending the right to vote to women); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII
(abolishing slavery); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (eradicating segregation in public
schools).
8. See Wagner, supra note 4. at 184.
9. See id. at 168-70.
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as objects which can be bought, sold, or rented is an affront to the principles of
human dignity and equality which we strive for as a community.
The design of the vast majority of surrogacy contracts demonstrates the
commodification of children through surrogacy. In many surrogacy contracts the
surrogate is paid nothing if she miscarries the child prior to the fifth month of
pregnancy, $1000 if the pregnancy results in a stillbirth after the fifth month, and
$10,000 if she gives birth to a live full term child.' ° These arrangements indicate
that it is the child, not the egg or gestation, that is being purchased." While such
arrangements could be outlawed, their current existence demonstrates that the
essential nature of surrogacy contracts is based on the commodification of the
children.
The manner of child selection further indicates the commodification of children
born through surrogacy contracts. For example, prospective parents can review the
personal characteristics of the ova or sperm donor such as height, weight,
educational achievements (as an indication of IQ), eye color, race, and physical
attractiveness, as well as a myriad of other characteristics. 2 Some have even gone
so far as to assert that prospective parents should be able to purchase gametes which
will maximize desirable physical features in a child even if the parents are
themselves fertile. 3 The search for the 'good' commodifies the child himself and
misses the point that all children are equally 'good' and deserving of dignity.
A final demonstration of the commodification of the children through surrogacy
and the use of surrogacy contracts is the fact that the parents' right to have a child
through this method is directly based on the their willingness and ability to pay for
the child.'4 As one commentator stated: "[A]doptive parents can tell their child,
'your mother loved you so much she gave you up, even though it made her sad,
because that was best for you.""' 5 But the contract father can only say: "Your
mother gave you up in order to earn $10,000[.]"6 While the contractual parents may
not actually tell their children this, studies indicate that economics is the primary
motivation for women who17decide to bear a child as a surrogate, so the underlying
commodification remains.

10. See, e.g., HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 141-53 (1994); M. Celeste SchejbalVossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine ofillegal Contracts,
32 ST.LOuis U. LJ.1171,1202 (1988).
11. See Schejbal-Vossmeyer, supra note 10, at1202. See also Irma S. Russell, Within the Best Interests of
the Child: The Factor ofParental Status in Custody Disputes Arising From Surrogacy Contracts, 27 J. FAM. L
585, 657 n.288 (1989) (discussing a '60 Minutes' interview conducted with Noel Keane, the leading proponent
of surrogacy contracts, in which Mr. Keane acknowledged that the baby is actually being sold in surrogacy
arrangements).
12. See George J. Annas, Human Cloning:A Choice oran Echo?, 23 U. DAYTON L REV. 247,259 (1998);
see also Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg Donor, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1999, at A10 (reporting
on a recent case where a couple advertised at Ivy League colleges for an egg donor who was over 5' 10", athletic,
and scored over 1400 on her S.A.T.).
13. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Libertyand the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth,
69 VA. L REv. 405, 429-31 (1983).
14. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 151.
15. Schejbal-Vossmeyer, supra note 10, at 1205 (quoting Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M, THE
NATION, May 23, 1987, at 682).
16. lit
17. See Yvonne M. Warlen, Comment, The Renting of the Womb: An Analysis of Gestational Surrogacy
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The surrogate process commodifies women as well. In a 'traditional' surrogacy
context where the surrogate mother's own egg is impregnated by the contractual
father's sperm, the surrogate is commodified in two ways. First, much like the child,
she is sought after as one who can provide the 'good' child in terms of race, IQ,
health, athletic ability, height, weight, etc. with 'better' surrogates in greater
demand. 8 In addition, although the surrogate and the sperm donor each contribute
one-half of the child's genes and the surrogate carries the child for nine months,
upon birth the sperm donor becomes the natural father while the surrogate remains
just that, a surrogate. 9
The commodification of the surrogate mothers is especially striking when
traditional surrogates are contrasted with gestational surrogates. In the traditional
surrogacy arrangement, where the surrogate donates half of the genetic material, the
surrogates tend to be working-class white women.2 ° However, in gestational
surrogacy arrangements, where the woman has the fertilized egg of another woman
21
implanted in her, the surrogates have tended to be lower-class women of color.
In the context of the commodification of both the women and children involved
in surrogacy agreements, there is no similarity to adoption, because, unlike
adoption, the mother in a surrogacy agreement brings a child into the world only in
response to the contracting parents' payment and demand. This contracting for
human beings is unacceptable because "[t]here are, in a civilized society, some
things that money cannot buy." 3 Long ago, this nation fought the Civil War in order
to establish that human beings are one of the things that money cannot buy.
2.

Surrogacy Contracts Violate the Dignity and Equality Guaranteed by the
Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
proclaims that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, ... shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."'24 Shamefully, New Mexico
had a part in the development of Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. A
widespread practice in New Mexico called "peonage"25 led to the adoption of 42
U.S.C. § 1994 and 18 U.S.C. § 1581.26

Contracts Under Missouri Contract Law, 62 UMKC L REV. 583, 589 (1994).
18. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L REv. 1849, 1932 (1987).
19. See Schejbal-Vossmeyer, supra note 10, at 1172.
20. See Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative
Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ.329, 375 (1995).
21. See iL
22. See Radin, supra note 18, at 1931.
23. In Re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIl.
25. See Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707, 707 (E.D. Ark. 1905) (peonage began under Mexican rule and

continued after New Mexico became a territory and the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified.)
26. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1994) (abolishing peonage and declaring all existing or future
peonage contracts void.); 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1994 & Supp. H 1996) (providing for imprisonment for up to 10 years
for persons engaging in the practice of peonage).
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Peonage was a practice not unlike the modem surrogacy agreements. 27 Under
peonage contracts, like modem surrogacy contracts, a free person 28 entered into a
contract for personal services for which he or she was paid in advance.29 Once this
contract had been entered into, the service contract became specifically enforceable
against the peon.' ° Under this system of labor, the rich landowners in New Mexico
bound a large class of peons.31 If a peon attempted to renege on his or her contract,
the master "pursued, reclaimed, and reduced him to obedience and33labor again; and
the alcaldes 32 ...aided the master in bringing back his fugitive.
Accordingly, New Mexico lent the weight of its government (under both
Mexican and American rule) to the enforcement of personal labor contracts in the
past. 34 However, this practice was outlawed by the peonage acts 35 in 1867. Some
consider this practice to be even more dangerous than slavery.36 Slavery is an
institution which we now recognize as clearly in violation of human rights for a host
of reasons. In contrast, peonage is an institution which is much more invidious
because the peons are encouraged, by poverty or greed, to enter into contracts which
grant control of their lives to men of great wealth and power.37 The modem debate
over the enforceability of surrogate contracts highlights the invidious nature of
peonage arrangements.
The use of the bodies of poor women in order to provide a maternal service for
richer women is not unknown in the history of our country. Black women
commonly served as 'wet nurses' to white children during slavery so that the white
women could "preserve the shape of their breasts." 38 The surrogate contract through
which women grant the use of their bodies to another for a fee mimics the classic
peonage arrangement "by which one person lets or grants to another person the
service of [her] person ... for a certain time. 39

27. See Cyril C. Means, Jr., Surrogacy v. The Thirteenth Amendment, 4 N.Y.L ScH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 445,
458 (1987).
28. See Jaremillo v. Romero, I N.M. 190, 199 (1857) ("All free men and women... may celebrate this
species of contract").
29. See id. at 194.
30. See id.
at 205.
31. Seeid. at194.
32. Alcaldes were the rough equivalent of a community Justice of the Peace. See idL at 199.
33. Id. at 194.
34. See Peonage Cases, 136 F.707, 707-08 (E.D. Ark. 1905).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1867).
36. See The Peonage Cases, 136 F.at 708.
37. See id.; cf.LEGISATuvE COMM'N ON ScIENcE AND TECH., CONTRAcr MOTHERHOOD: ETHICAL AND
LEGISIAnvE CONSIDERATIONS, REP. NO. 91-2, 47 (N.Y. 1991). Reacting to the potential for similar abuses in the
sale of organs the Legislative Commission noted that:
Our society prohibits the payment of money for any organ removed from an individual so as to
prevent a market in organs from forming. The intent of such a policy is to preclude a situation
where those with few financial resources could be put under duress. This is our public policy
despite the fact that the availability of an organ may mean the difference between life and death
for those in need.
Id
38. Lorraine Stone, Neoslavery-"Surrogate" Motherhood Contracts v. The Thirteenth Amendment, 6 LAw
& INEQ. J. 63, 72 (1988).
39. Jaremillo, I N.M. at 196 (describing the nature of the personal service contract employed in a peonage
situation).
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Such contracts are void as violative of the peonage act regardless of whether the
"laborer entered into that contract voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
conditions of [her] employment." Accordingly, New Mexico should make a clear
break from its disgraceful past, when women and children were sold into peonage,
by legislatively refusing to enforce this modem day peonage.
B.

"Maternal"Arguments that the SurrogateMust be Afforded Protectionby
the Law
Most discussion on this issue has focused on the rights and obligations of the
"parents" who contract for the child's birth. This approach further commodifies the
surrogate mother by treating her not as a mother, but merely as one who has
provided a paid service to the contracting couple.4 However, some have taken a
"maternalistic" approach to surrogacy by focusing on the surrogate's rights and
obligations. 2
The "matemalists" raise three major concerns from the surrogate's perspective.
First, the surrogate mother cannot truly give informed consent at the time she enters
into the contract.43 Second, the surrogate and her family bear consequences which
cannot be compensated through contract." Finally, the surrogate mother bears a
substantial biological tie to the child even when they are not genetically related.45
1. Lack of Informed Consent
New Mexico law requires that parties entering into medical contracts must give
informed consent to the procedure.' Informed consent means that the patient is
educated as to all pertinent facts concerning the medical procedure prior to giving
consent.47 Several states have passed legislation requiring that informed consent be
given in surrogacy procedures.' This legislation allows for surrogacy contracts but
requires judicial intervention prior to the inception of the surrogacy arrangement in
order to ensure that the surrogate is fully informed regarding the course which she
is to undertake.4 9
Regardless of judicial intervention, surrogate mothers are incapable of giving
fully informed consent for two reasons. First, although the surrogate should possess
a minimum level of understanding necessary for making an informed decision, the
motivations of the surrogate mother combined with her inequitable bargaining
position in relation to the contracting couple undermines her ability to appreciate
40. The Peonage Cases, 136 F. at 709.
41. See Radin, supra note 18, at 1930.
42. See Brinig, supra note 3,at 2383 n.22.
43. Seeid. at2381.
44. See id at 2390-92.
45. See Oxman, infra note 80, at 393.
46. See Demers v. Gerety, 92 N.M. 749,758, 595 P.2d 387, 396 (1978).
47. See N.M. UJ.L Civ. 13-1104(A) (explaining that physicians have a duty to obtain a patient's informed
consent prior to medical treatment); N.M. UJ.L CIV. 13-1104(B) (detailing information which a doctor has a duty
to communicate to the patient such as: (1) the patient's condition; (2) alternatives; and (3) hazards of the proposed
treatment).
48. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:16, -B:23 (Supp.
1992).
49. See sources cited supra note 48.
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the present and future effects of her decision." Second, the surrogate cannot
accurately predict the intervening factors which may occur over the next nine
months that could undermine her original consent.5
The few studies in this area have uncovered three primary factors which seem to
motivate women to become surrogate mothers.52 The frst is that the women indicate
that they enjoy being pregnant because it enhances their feelings of attractiveness
and femininity.53 This factor in and of itself is problematic because it implies that
at the time she enters into the contract, the potential surrogate is considering the
pregnancy itself rather than giving up the child.
A second common reason for entering into surrogacy agreements seems to be a
desire on the part of the surrogate to work through issues surrounding her previous
loss of a child through either abortion or adoption.' This reason for entering into
such a weighty agreement is suspect. A person who tries to work through issues
created by giving up a child previously by agreeing to give one up again may be
setting herself up for failure.
The third key factor motivating women to become surrogate mothers is
economics.55 Indeed, some studies indicate that money is usually the primary
motivation for surrogate mothers.' Hence, many family law scholars and feminists
condemn surrogacy agreements out of their fear that surrogates will be drawn from
historically exploited classes of people and that such a system commodifies both the
surrogates and their children.' In fact, these fears of class distinctions between the
surrogates and the contracting parents have proven to be correct.5"
The combination of these motivational factors place the surrogate in a highly
vulnerable position from the start. The inequitable position of the surrogate is
further intensified by the fact that most surrogates come into contact with the
contracting couple through the intercession of a middleman who is seeking to
ensure a proper match and a successfully completed contract.59 His desire to insure
that the contract is successfully completed clearly puts the middleman on the side
of the contracting couple by ensuring that he works toward the relinquishment of
the child rather than the best interests of the surrogate.
The inequity of bargaining power between the proposed surrogate and the
contracting parents is further illustrated by the intrusive nature of the surrogate
contract itself. First and foremost, the surrogate agrees to "rent" her body to another

50. See Stephen G. York, A Contractual Analysis of Surrogate Motherhood and a Proposed Solution, 24
LOY. LA. L REV. 395,404-05 (1991).
51. See id. at 408-10.
52. See id. at 399.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 399-400.
55. See id at 400.
56. See Warlen, supra note 17. at 589.
57. See Brinig, supra note 3. at 2380.
58. See RAGONE, supra note 10, at 54-55, 91 (discussing data which demonstrates the clear class
distinctions between surrogates and the people who hire them); see also Sarah N. Gatson, Labor Policy and the
Social Meaning ofParenthood, 22 L & Soc. INQUIRY 277, 293 (1997) (discussing the class differences between
surrogates and the hiring couples in several high-profile surrogacy arrangements).
59. Id. at 2393-94.
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for a period of nine months.' ° Prior to entering the contract, the surrogate must
normally undergo both psychological and physical examinations to ensure that she
is acceptable to the contracting parents for the task at hand.6' She must contract not
to have any sexual intercourse during a prescribed time.62 She must agree not to
consume alcohol or smoke during the pregnancy.63 Finally, the surrogate contracts
that she will not abort the child of her own will but she will abort the child if the
contractual parents so desire. 64
The central theme of most surrogacy contracts surrounds the agreement that once
the child has been delivered, the surrogate will relinquish all rights to the child in
favor of the contracting parents. 5 This situation requires that the surrogate
contractually bind herself to a course of action which she must perform in nine
months. This is inappropriate because the surrogate cannot have gauged precisely
what the effects of pregnancy and child-birth will be from her ex ante position.'
This commitment to a course of action which is to culminate in nine months
ignores the fact that much will change in and around the surrogate in the course of
the next nine months. Strong emotional bonding between a woman and the child
67
within her womb occurs even within women who do not intend to keep their child.
This bonding indicates that even mothers who enter a pregnancy with the intent of
relinquishing the child cannot be fully informed of the emotional consequences of
their decision at the outset.6 8
2. Psychological Effects on the Surrogate and Her Family
The surrogate and her family bear a psychological toll from the pregnancy and
relinquishment of the child which cannot be compensated within the contract.' The
potentially grave nature of these effects cautions against enforcement of the
agreement which may result in psychological harm not only to the surrogate but to
her children as well.7'

60. See Warlen, supra note 17, at 583-84.
61. See RAGONE, supra note 10, at 143-44.
62. See id. at 144.
63. See id. at 145.
64. See id The restrictions on the pregnant surrogate's right to engage in such activities (although they may
be wise) infringe on the surrogate's constitutional rights. See Schejbal-Vossmeyer, supra note 10, at 1187. Indeed,
the drafters of the contracts have recognized that some of the provisions are unenforceable yet they are still
included. See Elizabeth S. Cateforis, Surrogate Motherhood: An Argumentfor Regulation and a Blueprintfor
Legislation in Kansas, 4 KAN. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 101, 102 (1995); see also RAGONE, supra note 10, at 145. This
action demonstrates the coercive nature of the contract, in that it purposely includes terms which the drafters (the
attorneys who work for the contracting couple) wish to enforce against the surrogate despite their knowledge that
these terms are illegal. Additionally, these contractual provisions would be unenforceable by the courts since they
clearly violate the surrogate's constitutional rights. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (holding that
a court's enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action.)
65. See RAGONE, supra note 10, at 141-53; see also York, supra note 50, at 397.
66. See Brinig, supra note 3, at 2388.
67. See Edward K. Rynearson, Relinquishment and Its Maternal Complications: A Preliminary Study,
139:3 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 338, 339 (1982).
68. See York, supra note 50, at 401.
69. See id. at 397.
70. See id
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Many surrogacy agreements require that the surrogate has previously given birth
to at least one child.7 Indeed research indicates that many surrogates already have
children. 2 However, despite their inevitable involvement in the pregnancy of their
mother, the surrogate's children in this situation are third parties who are not a part
of the main action. 3 It is appropriate to evaluate this type of situation from a family
law perspective, placing the surrogate's children first despite parental attempts to
put their own interests first.7 4
Often, a surrogate who already has children of her own decides to bear a child
for another couple out of a desire for money or even out of an altruistic desire to
give a child to another family." Current debate and scholarship in this area has
focused on the wants and needs of the adults. However, this debate has not
addressed the potential impact on the surrogate's children who may be left asking:
Will mommy give me away if she needs money or decides that another couple needs
me more than her? 6 There appears to be no research regarding the psychological
consequences of surrogacy on the surrogate's children. Rather than encouraging the
continuation of a potentially harmful practice, this lack of knowledge should
counsel for extreme caution when analyzing surrogacy arrangements.
3. Physiological Connection Between the Surrogate and the Child
Much of the literature surrounding gestational' surrogacy has treated the
surrogate mother to be little more than a "breeder 78 who provides a womb for the
growth and development of a child who is genetically and biologically related only
to the woman who donated the ovum.79 However, despite this attitude by legal
scholars and courts, the Ethics Committee of the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists stands by the principle that gestation determines biological
motherhood regardless of genetics.8 °
In his highly technical article detailing the profound impacts which the
gestational mother's endocrine system has on the developing child, R. Brian Oxman
argued that "there is no organ system of the fetus that is not anatomically,
psychologically, and genetically affected by a gestational mother's endocrine

71. See Barbara L Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L
REv. 1, 59 n.133 (1988); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (BX6) (Michie Repl. 1995).
72. See Radin, supra note 18, at 1930 n.278 (citing Surrogate Motherhood: A Practice That's Still
Undergoing Birth Pangs, LA. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1987, § 6, at 12,col. 2).
73. See Brinig, supra note 3,at 2392.
74. See id.
75. See York, supra note 50, at 399-400.
76. See Brinig, supra note 3,at 2384.

77. Gestational surrogacy refers to the type of arrangement in which the surrogate mother is not genetically
related to the child which she carries because the ovum was donated by another woman. See, e.g., Denise E.
Lascarides, Note, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 25 HOSTRA L REV. 1221,
1226 (1997).
78. See Warlen, supra note 17, at 583-84.
79. See Lascarides,supra note 77, at 1259 ("Gestational surrogacy contracts, even if commercial, should
be viewed as personal services contracts, free from all purported public policy arguments, and completely enforced
...
.'); see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (concluding that the gestational surrogate had
been compensated for her services and had no parental rights in her child).
80. See R. Brian Oxman, Maternal-Fetal Relationships and Nongenetic Surrogates, 33 JURIM. J. 387, 396
(1993).
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system, and therefore, the resulting child is uniquely a product of the gestational
mother regardless of who contributed genetic material to the child."'" Ignoring the
contribution of the surrogate mother is not only scientifically unsound,8 2 it
reinforces the subjugation of the surrogate mother to the more powerful interests of
those who hired her to carry a child for them. Accordingly, there is no sound
scientific basis for upholding a surrogacy contract on the grounds that the surrogate
is not the ovum donor.
Surrogacy Contractsare Void Because they are Inconsistentwith the
Values Underlying CurrentNew Mexico Statutes
The enforcement of surrogacy contracts would violate several New Mexico
statutes in either letter or policy. Among these are: (1) statutes which prohibit the
transfer of parental rights for a fee; (2) statutes which establish the parentage of
children; (3) statutory provisions which outline the necessary procedures for the
termination of parental rights; and (4) statutes that require courts to determine the
best interests of children when placing them with individuals other than their natural
parents.
Although these statutes can apply to void surrogacy contracts, they are not
designed to do so. However, they demonstrate that this state embraces ideals of
human rights that are contrary to such contracts. Despite these ideals, without
explicit legislative action in this area, surrogacy contracts will continue to violate
the human rights that this state espouses. To emphasize the need for legislative
action in this area this Comment will analyze each of these statutes in order to
demonstrate the underlying policies and the inadequacies in addressing surrogacy
situations.
C.

1. Statutes Which Prohibit the Transfer of Parental Rights for a Fee
Under the New Mexico Children's Code83 the legislature specifically outlined the
types of permissible payments in the context of adoption." First, the statute only
allows the payment of certain expenses to third party vendors.8 5 Second, although
the statute does allow payment for such items as medical expenses 6 and living
expenses," it specifically states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
permit payment to a woman for conceiving and carrying a child."8 8 The code
provides that a party responsible for making statutorily unauthorized payments is
guilty of a full misdemeanor.8 9

81. Id. at 389. Oxman details the contributions that the gestational mother's endocrine system has on the
baby's heart, liver, blood vessels, neurological structure, physical appearance, mental capacity, and susceptibility
to disease. See id. at 393.
82. See id. at 393.
83. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A (Repl. Pamp. 1995).

84. See id. § 32A-5-34(B).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id.
See id. § 32A-5-34(B)(2).
See id. § 32A-5-34(B)(4).
Id. § 32A-5-34(F).
See id. §§ 32A-5-34(C), -42(A).
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Surrogacy agreements by their very nature contemplate a contract in which a
woman is paid for conceiving and carrying a child. On its face, a surrogacy contract
is apparently not only void as violative of the New Mexico Children's Code, but
may also expose the contracting parties to criminal liability. 9' Although this analysis
lends support to the notion that surrogacy contracts are void under New Mexico
law, it may be difficult to prosecute those who enter into surrogacy agreements for
violation of the Children's Code for two reasons.
First, there is currently no case law interpreting the scope of N.M. Stat. Ann.
section 32A-5-34 9 or N.M. Stat. Ann. section 32A-5-42.92 A second, and related,
concern is that because the statute does not specifically address paid surrogacy
arrangements, the rule of lenity" may be implicated, requiring that the statute be
interpreted in the defendant's favor." Despite the unlikely application of criminal
sanctions under New Mexico's adoption statutes, these statutes could be used by the
courts to invalidate surrogacy contracts. 5 Accordingly, this ambiguity in the law
beckons for legislative action to insure that the same policies that caution against
' in an adoption
"the payment to a woman for conceiving and carrying a child"96
context logically apply in the context of surrogacy as well.
2. New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act
The New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act" prescribes the methods by which the
parentage of children will be established. Under this act the default presumption
with respect to motherhood is that the woman who gave birth to the child is the
natural mother. 98 The statute allows for an "interested party"" to challenge
matemity. 1°° However, a contracting mother attempting to challenge the maternity
of the birth mother (surrogate) would have a difficult time because the act provides
for only one default position with respect to motherhood, the woman who gave
birth.101 Additionally, the state's jurisdiction statute"° limits the court's authority
in a maternity claim to those individuals who had sexual intercourse in the state
with respect to children who may have been conceived as a result of that
intercourse. °a Because the surrogate was not impregnated as a result of intercourse,
the New Mexico courts probably lack jurisdiction over her with respect to a
challenge to her maternity.
90. See id
91. Prohibits payment for conceiving or carrying a child.
92. Provides penalties for a violation of the payment provisions section 32A-5-34 of the New Mexico
Statutes.
93. See State v. Anaya, 123 N.M. 14, 23, 933 P.2d 223, 232 (1996).
94. See id. at 24, 933 P.2d at 233 ("[IThe existence of any ambiguity at to [the statute's] intended scope
requires ... that [they] be interpreted in the defendant's favor.").
95. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) (voiding a surrogacy contract on public policy
grounds because it violated New Jersey's child trafficking statutes).
96. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(F).
97. Id. §§ 40-1 1-1 to -11-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
98. See id. § 40-11-4.
99. Id. § 40-11-21.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id. § 40-11-8.
103. See id.
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The parental status of the surrogate's husband may be more difficult to establish.
The statute presumes that the surrogate's husband is the father of the child so long
as he and the birth (surrogate) mother were married to each other at the time the
child was born." However, the paternity issue is somewhat confused by the statute
defining paternity in cases of artificial insemination. 5 Under this statute, "the
husband is treated as if he were the natural father" if his written consent to the
insemination is filed with the vital statistics bureau. °6 In contrast, the statute
provides only that the donor of the semen "may be treated as if he were the natural
father" if he has filed a written consent.' °7 Again, it seems that the husband of the
birth mother is given priority since he "is" treated as the father while the donor of
the sperm "may be" treated as such.
The issue of paternity is clearer in a situation like that in Buzzanca, °8 where the
contracting man was not the donor of the sperm. The contracting man who has not
donated sperm is not even recognized under the artificial insemination statute in
New Mexico. Accordingly, determining parentage via a surrogate contract violates
New Mexico's Uniform Parentage Act" which, by its terms, purports to resolve
issues of parentage in this state. However, the lack of clarity in the parentage
statutes calls for legislative action.
3.

Statutory Provisions Which Outline the Procedures for the Termination of
Parental Rights
New Mexico provides statutory guidance for the termination of parental rights
in two contexts. First, parental rights may be terminated if there has been a finding
of child abuse or neglect. 1 0 Second, the parental rights of an individual may be
terminated as part of an adoption proceeding."1 However, the termination of
parental rights attempted by the surrogacy contracts does not begin to meet the
stringent requirements for termination under the New Mexico statutes in either
context.
Because the termination of parental rights is such an extraordinary action with
severe consequences, the courts in New Mexico have required that the dictates of
the termination statutes be strictly followed."' Under both the adoption and the
child abuse/neglect statutes a court must determine the factual grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence.' The purported termination of
parental rights in a surrogacy agreement fails to address the statutory requirements
of a judicial hearing. Therefore, any termination of parental rights by surrogacy
contract violates the provisions of the statutes which govern such an action and is
ineffective under New Mexico law.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. § 40-1 1-5(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
Id § 40-11-6(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id § 40-11-6(B) (emphasis added).
See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998).
See§§40-11-1 to-23.
See id. § 32A-4-29 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
See id. § 32A-5-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1995).

112.

In re Adoption of Doe, 101 N.M. 34,38,677 P.2d 1070, 1074 (CL App. 1984).

113. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-16(H). -4-29(J) (Cum. Supp. 1998).

Spring 1999)

STOPPING THE BABY-TRADE

Statutory Provisions Which Provide Guidance on the Placement of
Children with Individuals Other than Their Natural Parents
Under New Mexico law there are several situations (such as divorce, adoption,
and neglect) in which the courts are called upon to determine the placement of14a
child outside of the traditional family which most children are born into.'
However, the courts are not directed to look to contractual agreements in order to
establish placement of a child in any of these situations. Rather, the statutes and
court decisions in this area require the courts to look to the "best interests of the
children" to determine where the child should be placed." 5 Placing a child in a
home without regard to the best interests of that child when the custody and/or
parentage is challenged ignores one of the most basic protections which the state
gives to its most vulnerable members. To protect the children of surrogacy, New
Mexico must adopt legislation which provides them with the same basic protections
that it provides to other children." 6
4.

ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES WHICH MAKE SURROGACY
CONTRACTS UNENFORCEABLE
If New Mexico chooses to adopt a law to void surrogacy contracts as a matter of
public policy, it is likely to look to other states that have enacted similar legislation.
Ten states, plus the District of Columbia, currently have laws voiding surrogacy
contracts." 7 In addition, there is one uniform law which provides for an option of
voiding surrogacy contracts."' Although the purpose of these laws is the same, the
statutory approaches vary. Accordingly, the potential outcomes can be markedly
different when each of these statutes is applied.
To compare the effectiveness of these statutes this Comment will analyze them
with respect to the following four areas: (1) whether they apply to both paid and
unpaid surrogacy arrangements; (2) whether they provide for civil or criminal
penalties; (3) whether and how they address disputes regarding parental rights; and
(4) whether they apply to gestational. 9 surrogacy contracts. This Comment then
rate each of the statutes regarding the amount of clarity and guidance each gives to
the courts and citizens concerning the status of surrogacy contracts within the
Ill.

114. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9(A), -9.1(A), (B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994); see also In re Adoption of Doe,
101 N.M. at 37, 677 P.2d at 1073.
115. See id.
116. Despite the multitude of statutes outlined above which direct "best interests" analyses in the placement
of children, no New Mexico statutes currently direct such an analysis in a conflict arising out of a surrogacy
contract.

117. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-218 (1989); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-401, -402 (1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-20-1-1 to -3 (Michie 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.590, 199.990 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851-.863 (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2521,200 (1988); N.Y. DOM. REL LAW §§ 121-124 (McKinney Cum. P. Pt. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-1 to
-18-7 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210-.260 (West 1997).
118.

UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION Acr § 1, 5(altemative B) (1988).

119. Gestational surrogacy contracts are those contracts in which the surrogate mother is not genetically
related to the child which she carries because the ovum was donated by another woman. See discussion supra Part
Il.B.3.
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jurisdiction."2 In this section this Comment briefly discusses why each area of
evaluation is important and how this Comment rated statutes within this area. This
Comment then discusses some of the recurring problems within these statutes which
should be addressed within any statute promulgated by New Mexico.
Within the four areas of evaluation, the primary inquiry was whether the statute
was clear and consistent enough to promote the dignity and equality of the
individuals involved while providing for certainty of outcome to those who are
contemplating such an arrangement. In each category this Comment gives one point
for a statute which meets these goals and subtract one point for a statute which fails
to meet these goals.' While this methodology is not scientific, it does provide a
way of measuring the relative strength of each statute and its ability to effect a
certain yet equitable outcome.
A.

Application to Paidand Unpaid Contracts
Even non-monetary surrogacy contracts manifest the possibility that the surrogate
may renege on her agreement and seek to keep the child. In this situation, the courts
will be faced with the problem of whether to uphold the contract. Accordingly, the
state may be required to become a reluctant participant in the aftermath regardless
of whether the contract was for pecuniary gain.' Therefore,the first and most basic
point of any statute to void surrogacy contracts is that it must address both paid and
unpaid contracts in order to provide clarity and certainty in application.'
Several states have enacted legislation prohibiting only paid surrogacy
contracts. 4 While these statutes do offer some protection to the women and
children involved in surrogacy contracts, their lack of application in many contexts
may ultimately lead to more problems than they solve.
For example, in Washington, surrogacy contracts which are entered into for
compensation are void. 2 5 However, the statute exempts from its provisions
"payment of expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy and the actual medical
expenses of a surrogate mother and the payment of reasonable attorney fees for the
drafting of the surrogate parentage contract."'2 6 This language indicates that many
surrogacy agreements would be exempt from the voiding provisions of the
Washington law since many are designed primarily to reimburse the surrogate for
the expenses and troubles of pregnancy.' 2 7
The question remains; What happens when a dispute involving unpaid contracts
comes before the Washington courts? Two contradictory answers to this question

120. See infra app. I for the full text of my examination.
121. The resulting scores range from four points (for a statute which scored a point in each category) to
negative four points (for a statute which lost a point in each category).
122. See Keith J. Hey, Assisted Conception and Surrogacy-UnfinishedBusiness, 26 J. MARSHALL L REV.
775, 809 (1993).
123. When I evaluated state statutes in this category I gave them one point if they provided for application
to paid and unpaid contracts and subtracted one point if they did not.
124. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.590, 199.990 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713

(West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210-.260 (West 1997).
125. See WASH.REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.240.
126. See id. § 26.26.210.
127. See York, supra note 50, at 398.
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emerge from an analysis of Washington law. First, is the general principle of
statutory construction that where legislation includes particular language while
excluding other language, the inclusion or exclusion is presumed to be purposely
disparate." 8 This would seem to indicate that surrogacy contracts which are not
entered into for compensation would not be void in Washington since the legislature
chose not to include them in its prohibitory legislation.
However, during the same year that this statute was enacted, the Attorney
General of Washington expressed his opinion that "[a] surrogate parenting
agreement is not enforceable if the surrogate withdraws her consent to relinquish
her child."' 9 This indicates that even a non-paid surrogacy agreement may be void
in Washington.
The statutes voiding both paid and unpaid surrogacy contracts have avoided this
uncertainty. Their application to all surrogacy contracts serves notice on all
potential parties to surrogacy agreements that their contracts will never be binding.
The statutes that void surrogacy contracts protect the liberty interests of the
surrogate mother by allowing her full decisional capacity until and unless she
chooses to give her child up to another family. However, when only paid surrogacy
contracts are void, the liberty of the surrogate is ambiguous. Twenty five
law has taught us that "[1]iberty finds no refuge in a
tempestuous years of abortion
30
jurisprudence of doubt."'
B. Imposition of Civil or Criminal Penalties
As discussed before, the primary arguments for the criminalization of contracts
for surrogate motherhood are based on the same policies that underlie the
criminalization of baby-selling and slavery, namely that the dignity of all human
beings precludes treatment of a human as an article of commerce. Accordingly, it
is inconsistent for a state to take the position that the exchange of money for
children in a surrogacy context is offensive enough to warrant the invalidation of
such contracts on public policy grounds while not providing penalties for that same
conduct. This is especially so where the state has criminalized the exchange of
money through anti-baby-selling statutes and slavery/
children and adults for
3
prohibitions.'1
peonage
Despite the inconsistency of such positions, several states have declared
surrogacy contracts to be void while not providing penalties for those who endeavor
to purchase a child through surrogacy. However, most of these states prohibit the

128. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991).
129. See 4 WASH. OP. ATr'Y GEN. 1 (1989). Although this opinion was written prior to the enactment of the
Washington statute, it is not in direct conflict with the statute and therefore may still be persuasive.
130. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
131. when I evaluated state statutes in this category I gave them one point if they provided for penalties for
surrogacy contracts which involved monetary gain and subtracted one point if they did not. However, statutes that

allowed for the payment of medical expenses only were not penalized because most states allow the same in an
adoption context.
132. See ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998) (held unconstitutional in Soos v.
Superior Ct., 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1 to -3 (Michie 1997); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-1 to -7
(1989).
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sale of children in an adoption context and provide penalties for those who try to
engage in such activity.' This inconsistency is bound to lead to difficulties in the
application of such laws.
For example, the state may seek to prosecute those who engage in paid surrogacy
arrangements, claiming that the agreements fall within the class of activity
prohibited by the adoption statute. However, the defendant would argue that since
the legislature did not specifically provide criminal penalties for paid surrogacy
contracts, it did not intend to punish such arrangements despite their similarity to
paid adoptions. This argument would be consistent with the established Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding the failure of a legislature to act in a context similar
to one in which they have chosen to act previously."
Accordingly, states which act to void surrogacy contracts should specifically
indicate that any paid surrogacy arrangements are subject to criminal penalties.
Failure to do so could have the absurd result of creating an anti-surrogacy statute
which actually reduces the potential jeopardy of those who choose to engage in paid
surrogacy by negating their exposure to the prohibitions of anti baby-selling
statutes.
C.

Determinationof ParentalRights
Past litigation surrounding surrogacy contracts has almost exclusively involved
disputes over who has parental rights to the child. 3 A statute that voids surrogacy
contracts without providing an answer to questions of parentage would create far
more questions than it solves by invalidating the pre-existing agreement regarding
parentage without providing any alternative methods of establishing parentage.' 36
Any statute which voids surrogacy contracts should therefore provide at least a
default position which attempts to resolve parentage conflicts before they become
an issue. The statutory default position of most parentage statutes presumes that the
gestational and
birth mother is the mother and that her husband, if she is married,
37
is the father.
The current statutes which void surrogacy contracts address parentage issues in
one of three ways. Three states provide concrete guidance which establishes the
surrogate as the mother and her husband, if she is married, as the father. 13 The
second category includes three states who provide that the court shall conduct a
"best interests" analysis in order to determine the parentage of the child. 39 Finally,
133. See ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Michie
1998); L. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:286 (West 1986 & Cum. Annual P. Pt. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-05
(1989).
134. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395,404 (1991).
135. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (NJ. 1988); Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 280
(CLApp. 1998).
136. When I evaluated state statutes in this category Igave them one point if they provided for clear statutory
default rules regarding parentage and subtracted one point if they did not.
137. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr §§ 3,4,9B U.LA. 297-99 (1987).
138. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998) (held unconstitutional in Soos v.
Superior Ct., 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1989) (establishing surrogate's
husband as the father if he is a party to the agreement); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1953 & Repl. 1995).
139. See IND. CODE § 31-20-1-3 (1988) (applying "best interests" test through implication); MICH.COMP.
LAWs ANN. § 722.861 (West 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.260 (West 1997).
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seven states provide no meaningful guidance which courts can use to resolve
parentage issues."40
When enacting a statute which voids surrogacy contracts, states should recognize
that such statutes will almost invariably have the effect of creating conflicting
claims of parentage. To avoid unnecessary litigation, a statute should provide
concrete guidance regarding presumptions of parentage. The legislature can choose
among three different options in resolving parentage conflicts. First, it may choose
to create a presumption in favor of the surrogate and her husband (if she is married).
This would be consistent with other areas of family law which presume the birth
mother and her husband to be parents of the child.14 Second, it may presume that
the couple who contracted for the child are the parents. This choice would be
inconsistent with the purposes of the statute voiding the contract however, because
it would have the effect of enforcing the surrogacy arrangement as against the
surrogate mother. The final choice would be to presume that the genetic parents
(ovum and sperm donors) are the parents. This would be very difficult, if not
impossible, given that the gametes are often obtained from anonymous donors
through sperm and ova depositories.
Accordingly, the only logically and legally consistent way for the legislature to
provide concrete guidance, and therefore certainty, in the law of surrogate
relationships is to provide a parentage presumption in favor of both the surrogate
and her husband. 4 2
Statutory Application to GestationalAgreements
Until very recently, few considered the possibility that a child could have six
potential parents. However, the Buzzanca 43 case made it clear that those who are
drafting statutes which are to apply in surrogacy contexts should draft their statutes
broadly enough to cover all potential surrogacy situations (including future
advances in the science of reproductive technologies), yet clearly enough to provide
meaningful guidance.'" A statute voiding surrogacy contracts should therefore
apply to gestational as well as traditional surrogacy contracts.
Only two states have statutes that explicitly apply to gestational145 surrogacy
contracts.'4 Several state statutes seem to apply to gestational contracts but not
D.

140. See D.C. CODE §§ 16-401, 16-402 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.590, 199.990 (Banks-Baldwin
1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1988); N.Y. DOM. Ra. LAW §§ 121-124 (McKinney Cum P. PL 1999); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991).
141. See UNF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 3,4.

142. Recent caselaw in Arizona has demonstrated the need to be consistent in the framing of a parentage
statute. In Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Ariz. CL App. 1994) the Arizona Court of Appeals struck
down the Arizona surrogacy statute on the grounds that it violated the equal protection clause of the Arizona
Constitution because it allowed the biological father to rebut the presumption that the surrogate's husband was the
father but it did not provide the biological mother the same opportunity.
143. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
144. When I evaluated state statutes in this category I gave them one point if they provided for application
to gestational surrogacy contracts and subtracted one point if they did not.
145. See supra note 77.
146. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.853 (West 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.210 (West
1997).
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explicitly.14 Three statutes either do not apply to gestational contracts or are so
ambiguous that courts are unlikely to apply them. 4
Any statute that voids surrogacy contracts should void all surrogacy contracts
unless there is a valid reason for it to exempt only certain classes of surrogacy
contracts. It does not appear that the statutes that do not apply to gestational
contracts have exempted them intentionally. Rather, it is likely that such surrogacy
arrangements were simply not contemplated at the time these statutes were enacted.
Accordingly, new state statutes should be carefully drafted in order to include all
foreseeable surrogacy situations.
IV. PROPOSED NEW MEXICO SURROGATE PARENTAGE ACT
To address the problems of surrogacy discussed above, New Mexico should
enact legislation that will: (1) void all surrogacy contracts; (2) provide penalties for
those who engage in paid surrogacy arrangements; and (3) settle questions of
parentage which may arise when a surrogacy arrangement is invalidated. This
Comment proposes a New Mexico Surrogate Parentage Act and discusses its
application.
A. ProposedNew Mexico SurrogateParentageAct
Below is a proposal for a New Mexico Surrogate Parentage Act. Much of its
language is drawn from other statutes which effectively address surrogacy. Where
language is the same or substantially similar to a particular statute, the statute is
cited in appropriate footnotes.
Section 1: Definitions'4 9
"Compensation"-payment of money, objects, services, or anything of value
except payment of expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy and the
actual medical expenses of a surrogate mother.
"Participating Party"-includes a surrogate mother, spouse of a surrogate
mother, or the parties intended by the surrogate parentage contract to be the
mother and father of the resulting child.
"Surrogate Gestation"--means the implantation in a female of an embryo not
genetically related to that female and subsequent gestation of a child by that
female.
"Surrogate Mother"-means a female who is naturally or artificially
inseminated or undertakes surrogate gestation and who subsequently gestates
a child conceived through the insemination pursuant to a surrogate parentage
contract.
"Surrogate Parentage Contract"-means a contract, agreement, or
arrangement, whether written or unwritten, in which a female agrees to
conceive a child through natural insemination, artificial insemination, or
147. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998) (held unconstitutional in Soos v.
Superior C., 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-401 (1993); IND. CODE §§ 31-20-1-1
through 31-20-1-3 (1989); N.Y. DOM. REL LAw §§ 121-124 (McKinney Cur. P. Pt.1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1418-1, 14-18-5 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN § 76-7-204 (1989).
148. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West
1991); NEB.REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1988).
149. The definitions section is largely drawn from section 722.853 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
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surrogate gestation and to voluntarily relinquish her parental or custodial
rights to the child.
Section 2: Prohibitions' 50
A paid or unpaid surrogate parentage contract, whether executed in the State
of New Mexico or in another jurisdiction,"' shall be void and unenforceable
in the State of New Mexico as contrary to public policy.
No participating party, person, organization, or agency shall enter into,
induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate
parentage contract, written or unwritten, for compensation.
Section 3: Penalties' 52
Any participating party who enters into, induces, arranges, procures, or
otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract, written
or unwritten, for compensation shall be subject to the payment of a fine of
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
Any person, organization, or agency other than a participating party, which
enters into, induces, arranges, procures, or otherwise assists in the formation
of a surrogate parentage contract, written or unwritten, for compensation
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to imprisonment in the county
jail for a definite term of less than one year or to the payment of a fine of not
dollars ($1,000), or to both.
more than one thousand
15 3
Section 4: Parentage
The surrogate is the mother of a resulting child and the surrogate's husband
is the father of the child. If the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child
is governed by the Uniform Parentage Act (N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-11-1 to 23 (1978)).

B. Application
Under the New Mexico Surrogate Parentage Act there would be uniformity
of treatment among all types of surrogacy arrangements whether they are
150. The prohibitions section is drawn primarily from sections 26.26.230 and 26.26.240 of the Washington
Revised Code.
151. Although the conflict of laws and full faith and credit problems which may arise as a result of this
provision are beyond the scope of this paper, I will briefly address a few of the reasons why this provision would
still be effective under New Mexico law. First, although New Mexico has a strong public policy favoring the
freedom to contract, where choice of law provisions in a contract are clearly contrary to the public policies of New
Mexico, the state may refuse to enforce them. See, e.g., United Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 108 N.M. 467,470,775 P.2d 233,236 (1989); Reagan v. McGee Drilling Corp., 123 N.M. 68,72, 933 P.2d
867, 871 (CL App. 1997); see also State v. Edmondson, 112 N.M. 654, 659, 818 P.2d 855, 860 (Ct. App. 1991)
(stating that the strongest expression of a state's public policy is its penal law). Second, even if a surrogacy contract
has been upheld by the courts of another state, New Mexico could still impose the criminal and civil penalties from
its surrogacy statutes for conduct which occurred in New Mexico. See Edmondson, 112 N.M. at 659, 818 P.2d at
860. However, although New Mexico could attach criminal penalties for the conduct occurring within the state,
it would still be required to give full faith and credit to the judgments of the other state. See Delaney v. First Nat'l
Bank, 73 N.M. 192, 196, 386 P.2d 711, 714 (1963); see also Susan F. Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and
the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WiS. L REV. 399 (1990).

152. The penalties section is drawn from the prohibition language of section 26.26.230 of the Washington
Revised Code and section 123 of the New York Domestic Relations Law. The penalties for third parties providing
prohibited payments are the same as they are in connection with adoptions under section 32A-5-42 of the New
Mexico Statutes.
153. This parentage section is drawn from section 5, alternative B of the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act with reference to sections 40-11-1 to -23 of the New Mexico Statutes for determination
of the paternity of the child when paternity cannot be determined by this section.
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gestational or traditional." In either situation, the contract would be void and
the surrogate mother and her husband would be the parents of the resulting
child.155 If the surrogate was unmarried, the paternity of the child would be
determined according to the provisions of the New Mexico Uniform Parentage

Act. 156
The Surrogate Parentage Act would void both paid and unpaid contracts. 57
Where the arrangement is procured for compensation, the surrogate and her
husband as well as the proposed parents are subject to a civil fine. Others
who are involved in the arrangement are exposed to criminal liability just as
59
they would be for making prohibited payments in an adoption context.
However, payment under this act does not include medical expenses or
expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy."W This allows for treatment
consistent with adoption arrangements,
where the mother can be paid for
6
medical and living expenses.1 1
V. CONCLUSION
Science and technology have provided great possibilities in the area of
human reproduction. However, science does not address the moral and legal
issues inherent in the application of the techniques which it makes possible.
It is the province and duty of the legislature guided by the moral pillars of our
society, dignity and equality, to answer the legal questions raised by scientific
advancements. 63 New Mexico must act to protect the dignity of all its citizens
by clearly establishing a policy of prohibiting all activities which result in the
commodification and sale of human beings no matter what form they take. In
order to act effectively in this area, New Mexico should adopt legislation
which will: (1) void all surrogacy contracts; (2) provide penalties for those
who engage in paid surrogacy arrangements; and (3) settle questions of
parentage which may arise when a surrogacy arrangement is invalidated.

154. See supra Section 1.
155. See supra Sections 2,4.
156. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11-1 to -23 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
157. See supra Section 2.
158. See supra Section 3.
159. See supra Section 3.
160. See supra Section 1.
161. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B)(2), (4) (Repl. Pamp. 1995).
162. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 133.
163. See John R. Dunne & Gregory V. Serio, Surrogate Parenting After Baby M: The Ball Moves To The
Legislature's Court, 4 TouRo L REv. 161 (1988).
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